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. SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution gives
the Supreme Court control and general supervision over inferior
courts, including the authority to determine the delays for apply-
ing for supervisory writs. The new Code makes no change in
this area.7 4
EFFCTIVE DATE OF THE CODE
Act 15 of 1960 provides in Section 4 (B) (2) (a) that none of
the provisions of the new Code shall decrease or shorten any
procedural delay granted or allowed by any law in existence im-
mediately prior to, and which had commenced to run but had not
yet completely elapsed on, the effective date of this act. An ex-
ample of the importance of this provision is found in the devolu-
tive appeal. If judgment is rendered on December 1, 1960, the
appellant will still have one year to appeal even though the new
Code goes into effect January 1, 1961, and would allow only
ninety days for a devolutive appeal.
Sam J. Friedman
Venue
The section of the Code of Civil Procedure entitled "Venue"
contains the provisions relating to the parish in which an action
must or may be brought. Some special venue provisions are
found in other sections of the Code, as well as the Revised Stat-
utes, but the over-all result has been a comprehensive consolida-
tion of the rules of venue and the elimination of much duplica-
tion.1
The concept of jurisdiction in Louisiana was formerly sub-
divided into jurisdiction ratione materiae and jurisdiction ra-
74. Id. art. 2201.
1. The 1960 acts, in conjunction with the Code of Civil Procedure, amended
or repealed 11 articles of the Revised Civil Code and 20 provisions of the Revised
Statutes of 1950 on the subject of venue. With regard to the Code of Practice
of 1870, approximately 34 articles dealt with venue, either directly or indirectly.
The venue provisions now found in the Revised Statutes are of a particularized
nature, not warranting inclusion in the Code itself. The venue provisions for-
merly found in the Civil Code were removed, and only matters relating to the
cause of action remain. Examination of the acts of 1960 reveals that the follow-
ing articles of the Louisiana Civil Code relating to venue were either repealed
or amended so as to remove the venue provision: Articles 142, 307, 935, 1101,
1113, 1114, 1162, 1193, 1210, 1327.
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tione personae, the difference being that the former went to the
competence of the court to hear the issue and the latter referred
to the place where the defendant could be sued.2 Considerable
confusion8 in these concepts was engendered by the introduction
of the common law terms and concepts, beginning with the de-
cision of the United States Supreme. Court in 1878 in Pennoyer
v. Neff,4 which required a state court to have jurisdiction over
the person in order for its decision to be entitled to full faith
and credit.5
The concepts of jurisdiction ratione materiae and jurisdiction
ratione personae are not used in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Instead the Code adopts the common law concepts of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person,
and venue. This change in terminology was adopted in an at-
tempt to alleviate the confusion created by the necessity of recog-
nizing the Anglo-American concepts in cases having an interstate
effect. 6
GENERAL RULES OF VENUE
Formerly, Article 162 of the Code of Practice set forth the
general rule that "one must be sued before his own judge, that is
to say, before the judge having jurisdiction over the place where
he has his domicile or residence," and the code articles that fol-
lowed set forth the exceptions to the general rule. Because Ar-
ticle 162 made no distinction between the different types of j udi-
cial persons, such as partnerships, corporations, and individuals,
2. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 210 (1952).
3. The confusion centered over which were rules of jurisdiction ratione per-
sonae, and therefore waivable under the Code of Practice, and which were rules
of jurisdiction ratione materiae, and not waivable. The exact cause of the con-
fusion is not entirely clear. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 210 (1952) ;
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Civil Pro-
cedure, 18 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 103, 105 (1957). The confusion over this
issue reached the point that one court recognized on its own motion the lack of
Jurisdiction ratione personae, reasoning that Code of Practice Article 162 ex-
pressly provides that the defendant must be sued at his domicile and if suit is
brought elsewhere the defendant is under no compulsion to remind- the court of
its lack of jurisdiction. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Thornton, 56
So.2d 308 (La. App. 1952), 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 503 (1952).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
5. Jurisdiction over the person is best defined as the power to exercise au-
thority over the person of the defendant by reason of valid service of process or
voluntary appearance in court. The civil law approach to this problem was to
apply the rules of citation and service of process. See LA. CoDE OF CIVIL PRO-
GEDuE, Introduction to Book I, Courts, Actions and Parties, p. 2 (1960). See
also Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 210, 213 (1952).
6. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Introduction to Book I, Courts, Actions and
Parties, p. 2 (1960). . . ..
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the legislature found it necessary to create a large number of
exceptions, both in the code itself and in statutes. 7
Article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand,
provides a general rule of venue for seven classifications of judi-
cial persons, permitting a much narrower range of exceptions.
These classifications will be considered in detail and the changes
effected in the former law will be noted.
An individual domiciled in the state must be sued in the par-
ish of his domicile. This is the rule under both the old and new
Codes."
Similarly, under the prior jurisprudence and statutes9 and
under the Code of Civil Procedure,10 a domestic corporation or a
domestic insurer must be sued in the parish where its registered
office is located, which is considered to be its domicile.'
A domestic partnership under both the old and new Codes12
must be sued in the parish where its principal business establish-
ment is located. Formerly where there were several establish-
ments, the partnership had to be sued before the court of the
place where the obligation was entered into.13 Article 77 of the
Code of Civil Procedure makes a change by providing that a per-
son having a business office or establishment in a parish other
than that of his principal establishment may be sued, on a matter
over which this office had supervision, in the parish where this
office is located. This provision applies to partnerships as well
as individuals. 14 Thus, the choice rests with the plaintiff to sue
at the principal business establishment or in the parish of the
office which had supervision of the matter in question.
Article 42(5, 6) of the Code of Civil Procedure makes a dis-
7. Each of the venue provisions repealed by the acts of 1960 formerly con-
stituted an exception to the general rule of venue. See note 1 8upra.
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 162 (1870); LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 42(1) (1960).
9. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, repealed La. Acts 1918, No. 179, § 1(5) (d), the
former venue provision for suits against domestic corporations. The court, in
Tichenor v. Tichenor, 184 La. 743, 167 So. 427 (1936) and Ramey v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La. App. 1941), recognized this, and held that it wan
therefore necessary that domestic corporations be sued at their domicile.
10. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42(2) (1960).
11. LA. R.S. 12:37 (1950).
12. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165(2) (1870) ; LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 42(3) (1960).
13. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165(2) (1870).
14. This follows from LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5251(12) defining
"person" to include an individual, partnership, unincorporated association of in-
dividuals, joint stock company, or corporation.
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tinction between a nonresident defendant who has appointed an
agent for the service of process and one who has not. The term
nonresident as used here includes individuals who do not reside
in the state and partnerships and unincorporated associations
organized and existing under the laws of another state, 5 but
does not include foreign corporations or alien insurers, 6 for
which special rules of venue are provided.17 If a nonresident has
appointed an agent for the service of process in the manner pro-
vided by law, suit must be brought in the parish of the desig-
nated post office address of the agent.' 8 A provision has been
added to the Revised Statutes which requires the filing with the
Secretary of State of notice of such appointment by nonresident
individuals and partnerships. 19 If a nonresident has no ap-
pointed agent, suit must be brought in the parish where the proc-
ess is served on the defendant. 20 However, any judgment ren-
dered in the latter case against a foreign, partnership would be
binding only upon the partnership itself and the partners served,
and a valid personal judgment could not be entered against the
nonresident partner not personally served.
A major change is effected in the law by these provisions, for
under the Code of Practice a nonresident individual could be sued
in the parish where service was made whether or not he had
appointed an agent,2 ' there being no provision for the filing of
notice of appointment with the Secretary of State.22 Formerly
suit against a foreign partnership was permitted at the place
where its business was being conducted, but, as under the present
15. Id. art. 5251(11).
16. Id. art. 42. Both Sections 5 and 6 provide that they apply to "a foreign
corporation .. . other than a foreign or alien insurer. ...."
17. Id. art. 42(4), (7).
18. Id. art. 42(6). One of the most important means of obtaining jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant is by means of the nonresident attachment provided
for In id. art. 3545. In such a case the proper venue is in any parish where the
property to be attached is situated.
19. LA. R.S. 13:3485 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6.
20. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42(5) (1960).
21. See Id. art. 42, Comment (h) ; LA. CODE Or PRACTICE art. 165(5) (1870).
Under the new Code, as under the Code of Practice, suit must be brought in the
parish where the nonresident is cited. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42(5)
(1960). This feature was questioned by the Redactors in the early stages of the
revision, and a suggested change would have allowed the nonresident to be sued
in one parish and cited wherever he could be found, but this was not adopted by
the Law Institute. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF
PRACTICE, ExPosA DES MOTIFS No. 3, Book I, Courts, Actions and Parties, Title
I, Courts, Chapter 2, Venue, p. 5a (1951).
22. Formerly LA. R.S. 13:3471(19) (1950) provided that a nonresident could
deposit with the sheriff or any constable of the parish a notarial act providing for
the appointment of an agent for the service of process.
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law, no partner was bound by the judgment unless he had been
personally served.23
Although the Revised Statutes provided that a voluntary as-
sociation could be sued in the name of the association,2 4 formerly
there was no provision prescribing the venue for such a suit,.and
the courts apparently never remedied the situation.25 The Code
of Civil Procedure provides a remedy, and suits against a do-
mestic unincorporated association must be brought at its prin-
cipal business establishment. 6
Formerly a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Lou-
isiana could be sued in a variety of places, depending upon the
nature of the cause of action.27 The Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides one basic venue for suits against such corporations, this
being the parish where the principal business establishment of
the foreign corporation is located, as designated in its applica-
tion to do business in the state. 2
In the case of a foreign corporation not licensed to do busi-
ness in Louisiana, the law formerly allowed the plaintiff the
same choice as in the case of licensed corporations.29 The Code
23. Klotz v. Tru-Fruit Distributors, 173 So. 592 (La. App. 1937). Under the
rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), the Louisiana court was'precluded
from reaching any other result, and because of the continued vitality of the rule
of this case the Redactors of the new Code made no attempt to provide for any
other result.
24. LA. R.S. 13:3471(22) (1950). Section 22 was repealed by La. Acts 1960,
No. 32, § 1.
25. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDURE art. 42, Comment (b) (1960).
26. Id. art. 42(3).
27. LA. R.S. 13:3235 (1950), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 2, pro-
vided:-"In all of the cases provided in R.S. 13:3234 the venue of the suit-shall
at the option of the plaintiff be either at the domicile of the corporation, or where
it has its main office, or in the parish where the cause of action arose, if it result
from a trespass or offense or quasi offense; but if the cause of action result from
any other cause, the venue of the action shall be in the parish where is or was
located the particular office which had supervision of the transaction from which
the cause arose; or in the absence of any such office, at the place where acts of
the corporation, its employees or agents were performed or the place where service
is obtained through an employee or agent of the corporation; or at the domicile of
the corporation if the plaintiff so elects."
Another rule of venue was provided in Id. 13:3234, which the Supreme Court,
in Abadie v. National Petroleum Corp., 150 La. 1076, 91 So. 516 (1922), held to
be irreconcilable with the rule of 13:3235, and the latter provision was held to
be the applicable law, being the later expression of the legislature.
28. LA. CODE OF CIvI. PROCEDURE art. 42(4) (1960). Note that the exceptions
to the general rule of Article 42, found in Articles 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 80,
would be applicable in this, as in all cases. These exceptions will be considered in
detail later in this Comment.
29. LA. R.S. 13:3235 (1950) made no distinction between a foreign corporation
licensed to do business and one not so licensed.
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of Civil Procedure provides such a corporation must be sued in
the parish where service is made.80
EXCEPTIONS
The Code of Practice provided a general rule of venue fol-
lowed by various permissive and mandatory exceptions. The
Code of Civil Procedure follows generally the same scheme. Thus,
the general rules of venue are contained in Article 42, the per-
missive exceptions in Articles 71 through 77, and the mandatory
exceptions in Articles 78 through 83. Several other mandatory
exceptions are contained in other parts of the Code.3 ' Permissive
exceptions are indicated by the use of the word "may" and man-
datory exceptions by the word "shall."3 2 The consistent use of
these words to indicate only one meaning eliminates one of the
major sources of confusion existing under the Code of Practice.8
If the exception is permissive, the plaintiff has the choice of
bringing suit at the place provided in the general rule, or at that
provided in the exception, and the defendant may not except to
either choice. If, however, there is a mandatory exception to the
general rule, the suit must be brought at the place provided for
in the exception on the penalty of dismissal or transferral upon
timely objection by the defendant.3 4 Likewise, if there is no ex-
ception to the general rule of venue the plaintiff must bring
suit at the place provided in Article 42, or it may be dismissed
or transferred upon timely objection by the defendant. But if
30. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42(5) (1960). The difficult problem in
most cases of an unlicensed corporation is that of service. This was to a great
extent alleviated in 1950 by an amendment to R.S. 13:3471, providing that a cor-
portion not licensed to do business in the state could be served in any pro-
ceeding on a cause of action resulting from or relating to acts performed in this
state or any taxes or other obligations, and the service could be made on any em-
ployee or agent of the corporation over eighteen years of age found in this state.
In the event an employee could not be found, service could be made on the Secre-
tary of State. LA. R.S. 13:3471 (1950).
La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1, amended R.S. 13:3471 so that now service may be
made on any employee or agent of the corporation of suitable age, and it is not
necessary that the service be in the parish where the suit is pending.
31. These are LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 593, 1034, 2006, 2633, 2811,
2812, 3652, 3656, 3941, 3991, 4031, 4032, 4541, 4603, 4653 (1960). See also id.
art. 3545.
32. Id. art. 5053.
33. Rathborne Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 164 La. 502, 114 So. 112 (1927). See
Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 210 (1951).
34. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 121 (1960) provides that if an action
is brought in a court of improper venue, the court may dismiss the action, or in
the interest of justice may transfer it to a court of proper venue. The comments
following this article point out that it is an innovation in Louisiana procedure,
adopted to eliminate needless costs and delays. See also id. art. 932 and Com-
ments.
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the defendant fails to object timely, meaning prior to answer or
judgment by default, 85 the venue is proper and a valid judgment
may be rendered.86
Real Property
Under the Code of Practice, certain actions involving im-
movable property could be brought at the situs of the property
or the defendant's domicile. As enumerated in Article 163 of the
Code of Practice, these actions were for revendication of real
property, proceedings to obtain the seizure and sale of real prop-
erty by virtue of an act of mortgage importing confession of
judgment, the action to enforce a legal or judicial mortgage
against a third possessor, the action to enforce a special mort-
gage against a third possessor, and all cases of provisional sei-
zure or sequestration. As interpreted, Article 163 provided the
rule of venue for the real actions, including the petitory action,8 7
the action for slander of title,8 8 and the possessory action.89 Ar-
ticle 165 (8) provided that actions of trespass on real estate and
all matters relating to real servitudes "shall be brought" in the
parish where the property was situated. While this article was
couched in mandatory language, apparently suit at the domicile
of the defendant was still permitted. 4
The Code of Civil Procedure contains two articles which, in
cases involving real property, provide exceptions to the general
rules of venue set forth in Article 42. Article 72 provides that
an action of sequestration or an action to enforce a mortgage or
privilege by an ordinary proceeding may be brought in the parish
where the property is located. All of the situations formerly
covered by Code of Practice Articles 163 and 165 (8) do not come
within this provision. The real actions, including the petitory
action, the action of slander of title, and the possessory action,
formerly covered by Article 163 of the Code of Practice, are
treated in Article 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals
with actions "to assert an interest in immovable property, or a
right in, to or against immovable property."' 41 Although Article
35. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocwuaE art. 928 (1960).
36. Id. art. 44.
37. Reugger v. Debrueys, 146 La. 283, 83 So. 556 (1920) ; Blanchard v. Ter-
nant, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 188 (La. 1826).
38. Williams v. Zengle, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153 (1906).
89. McKenzie v. Bacon, 38 La. Ann. 764 (1886).
40. Rathborne Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 164 La. 502, 114 So. 112 (1927).
41. LA. CoDE OF CIvI PROCEDURE art. 80 (1960). See also id. arts. 3652, 3656.
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80 sets forth the same rule of venue for these actions as is con-
tained in Article 72, there is an important difference in that the
venue provided in Article 80 is mandatory, and the plaintiff may
not choose the general rule of venue provided in Article 42,
whereas Article 72 is permissive and the plaintiff may choose to
bring suit at the place provided in Article 42.42
A significant change in the prior law is made in the second
paragraph of Article 72, where it is expressly provided that un-
less the defendant objects to the venue of any of the actions
brought under the terms of that article, the court may render
personal judgment against him. This is contrary to the rule con-
tained in the Code of Practice to the effect that judgments in
such cases were only operative up to the value of the property
proceeded against, and not binding for any excess over that
amount in personam against the defendant.43 As interpreted in
Franek v. Turner,44 this latter rule applied even in a case where
the defendant permitted a default judgment to be rendered
against him. Under the new provision, in the absence of a timely
objection to the venue, a personal judgment may be rendered
against the defendant.
Successions
Article 81 of the Code of Civil Procedure tracks closely the
provisions of Article 164 of the Code of Practice, and like the
prior law, it is mandatory in its requirement that certain enu-
merated actions be brought in the parish in which the succession
was opened. These actions are: a personal action by a creditor
of the deceased, an action to partition the succession, an action
to annul the testament of the deceased, and an action to assert a
right to the succession of the deceased. As under the prior law,45
the restrictions on venue end immediately upon the acceptance
of the succession when the coheirs become coproprietors. There-
after actions between the co-owners may be brought pursuant to
the rules provided in Article 4603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
42. Note that Article 72 does not apply in cases of executory process, but ex-
pressly provides it applies only in "ordinary proceedings." Article 2633 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides the venue in cases of executory proceedings.
Note also that Article 72 is broader than Article 163 of the Code of Practice,
for it is not limited to immovable property, but is intended by the Redactors to
apply to both movable and immovable property. Article 80, however, applies only
to immovable property.
43. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 163 (1870).
44. 164 La. 532, 114 So. 148 (1927).
45. See Freret v. Freret, 31 La. Ann. 506 (1879).
19601
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Contrary to the former rule, 46 Article 81(1) provides that if a
creditor brings a personal action against the deceased prior to
his death, it may be prosecuted thereafter in the court in which
it was brought. Aside from this, no significant change is made
in the law, but several rules of venue which were formerly found
in places other than the Code of Practice, such as for an action
to partition the succession,47 have been incorporated into the new
Code.
Partition
Under the prior law a suit for partition of real property be-
tween several coproprietors had to be brought in the court of
the place where the property was situated.48 In such a case the
suit could only affect such property as was located in the parish,
and where the land was situated in more than one parish and was
not contiguous, a court of one parish could not render a judgment
of partition. 4
Similarly, under the Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
partition of immovable property must be brought in the parish
where the immovable property is situated. 50 However, a simpli-
fication is made in that it is expressly provided that if the prop-
erty consists of one or more tracts, situated in more than one
parish, the action may be brought in any of these parishes,5 1 the
intention being to simplify the procedure and permit one suit
rather than several to be brought.
In 1954 a provision for venue in case of suits for partition
of community property after divorce or separation from bed and
board was added to the Revised Statutes, providing that venue
in such cases was vested exclusively in the district court of the
last matrimonial domicile of the marriage, despite the fact that
the divorce or separation was granted by a different court.52 In
the absence of such a matrimonial domicile the venue prescribed
46. LA. CODE OF Pn cTI art. 164(2) (1870).
47. LA. CIVIL COD art. 1137 (1870), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2;
id. art. 1327, repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2.
48. LA. CoDE OF PRA C E art. 165(1) (1870).
49. Johnson v. Burton, 202 La. 152, 11 So.2d 513 (1942). In this case the
court held that the judgment was void even as to the property in the court's parish.
50. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PaoczsuRE arts. 80, 4603 (1960). This rule has three
exceptions. These are: (1) an action to partition the succession which has been
opened (art. 81) ; (2) the action to partition community property (art. 82)
and (3) the action to partition partnership property (art. 83).
51. Id. art. 80.
52. LA. R.S. 13:4991 (1950), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 2.
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was the district court having jurisdiction over the immovable
property belonging to the community or having jurisdiction over'
the principal immovable property in the event property was lo-
cated in more than one parish.58
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, an action for partition of
community property must be brought either as an incident to the
action which would result in the dissolution of the community, or
as a separate action in the parish where the judgment dissolving
the community was rendered.5 4 Since the action dissolving the
community may or may not be at the matrimonial domicile,5 5 a
change is effected in the law in those cases in which it is not. As
in the former law, the new Code makes special provision for the
partition of a community that owns immovable property, provid-
ing that the suit may be brought in the parish where any of the
immovable property is situated. 56 This is more liberal than the
former rule, which allowed suit at the situs of the property only
in the absence of a matrimonial domicile.
A provision of the Code of Civil Procedure identical to that
providing for venue in cases of partition of community property
provides the rules of venue in suits for the partition of partner-
ship property after or during the suit for dissolution of the part-
nership. 7 Like the article on partition of community property,
it qlso effects a change in the law, for it appears that formerly
suit in such cases could only be brought at the situs of the prop-
erty.58
Joint or Solidary Obligors
The first paragraph of Article 73 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure makes no change as to venue in an action against joint
or solidary obligors, providing that the action may be brought
in any parish of proper venue as to any obligor made a party
defendant.59 However, some change in the prior law is made
by the second paragraph of this article. Formerly, if the suit:
against the resident defendant was dismissed for any reason,
an exception by the nonresident defendants to the jurisdiction..
ratione personae of the court was sustained This was true"
53. ibid.54. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 82 (1960).
55. See id. art. 3941 providing venue in actions for divorce or separation.-56. Id. art. 82.
57. Id. art. 83.
58. Id. art. 83, Comment (a).
59. LA. CODE OF PR.CcicE art. 165 (6) (1870) provided: "When the defendants
1960]
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whether the action against the resident defendant was dismissed
because it stated no cause of action,60 because it had prescribed
as to him,0 ' because he had compromised his portion of the suit,62
or because he was found not liable after trial on the merits.6'
Article 73 provides, however, that if the action against the resi-
dent defendant is compromised, or is dismissed after trial on
the merits, the venue will nevertheless remain proper as to the
nonresident defendants, unless it is shown that the joinder was
made for the sole purpose of establishing venue as to the other
defendants. If the suit as to the resident is dismissed for any
other reason, such as an objection of no cause of action, then
apparently the venue as to the nonresident defendants will be
found to be improper, as under the former law.
Damages For Offenses Or Quasi Offenses
Article 165 (9) of the Code of Practice provided a permissive
exception in the case of a suit for trespass, permitting it to be
brought not only in the parish of the defendant's domicile, but
also in the parish in which the trespass was committed or where
the damage was done. A distinction was made between acts of
commission and acts of omission. This exception applied to acts
of commission of "any person, firm or domestic or foreign cor-
poration," but it applied to acts of omission only of foreign or
domestic corporations. The word "trespass" was used in its
broad sense of committing acts that injure another,0 4 and was
interpreted to include damages arising ex contractu as well as
ex delicto.65
Article 74 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi of-
fense may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct
occurred, or in the parish where the damages were sustained.
There is no distinction made between acts of omission and acts
of commission. Another important change is effected by the
express use of the words "offense or quasi offense," which ren-
are joint or solidary obligors, they may be cited at the domicile of any one of
them."
60. Tate v. Dupuis, 195 So. 810 (La. App. 1940).
61. DeBouchel v. Koss Const. Co., 180 La. 615, 157 So. 270 (1934).
62. State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944), 19 TUL. L. Rv.
458 (1945).
63. Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 182 La. 795, 162 So. 624 (1935).
64. Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 153 So. 453 (1936).
65. T. A. Dubell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 211 La. 167, 29 So.2d 709
41947) ; O'Brien v. Delta Air Corp., 188 La. 911, 178 So. 489 (1938).
[Vol. XXI
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ders the article inapplicable to cases of damages arising ex con-
tractu.
Insurance Policies
Under both the former law66 and the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, special rules of venue are provided respecting suits on
certain types of insurance policies. While Article 76 of the new
Code sets out these provisions with greater clarity 7 than was
done in the Code of Practice, 8 it effects no change in the law
except in one minor respect.6 9 A complete integration of all the
provisions relating to suits against insurers was not attempted,
and at least two significant rules are retained in the Revised
Statutes.70 The venue of actions brought under the Direct Ac-
tion Statute remains unchanged. 71
Dual Domicile and Related Problems
In both the old and new Codes exceptions to the general rules
66. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165(10) (1870).
67. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 76 (1960) : "An action on a life insur-
ance policy may be brought in the parish where the deceased died, the parish where
he was domiciled, or the parish where any beneficiary was domiciled.
"An action on a health and accident insurance policy may be brought in the
parish where the insured is domiciled, or in the parish where the accident or ill-
ness occurred.
"An action on any other type of insurance policy may be brought in the parish
where the loss occurred or the insured is domiciled."
68. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165(10) (1870) provided: "Insurance. In all
suits on a policy of fire, life, marine, medical protective, accident insurance or sick
benefit insurance or vehicle collision insurance, and all matters pertaining thereto,
the defendant may be sued at the domicil of the insurance company, or in the
place where its principal agency is established, or in the parish where the loss
occurred, or in case of life insurance, at the domicil of the deceased or his bene-
ficiary, or in the case of accident insurance, or vehicle collision or fire insurance,
at the domicil of the insured or in the parish where the accident occurred, or in
the parish where the accident policy was written, and in case of sick benefits at
the place where the claimant resides at the time of his sickness.
"This paragraph ten (10) shall have full application to all suits on policies
issued by fraternal orders and mutual benefit insurance societies, orders, associa-
tions or corporations, as regulated by Act 256 of 1912 and the amendments there-
to." As amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 261, § 1.
69. Under Article 165(10) of the Code of Practice, a suit on accident insurance
could be brought at the domicile of the insured, or in the parish where the accident
occurred, or in the parish where the accident policy was written. Article 76 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides only for suit in the parish where the insured is
domiciled or in the parish where the accident occurred. Thus, suit may no longer
be brought in the parish where the accident policy was written, unless, of course,
It happens to be the domicile of the insured or the parish where the accident hap-
pened.
70. LA. R.S. 22:1268 (1950) provides for suit against an unauthorized insurer.
Id. 22:655 provides the venue in direct action suits.
71. Id. 22:655, as amended and re-enacted by La. Acts 1958, No. 125, provides
that the venue for actions brought under the provisions of that section shall be
in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the
Insured or insurer is domiciled.
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of venue are provided with respect to individuals who change
domicile. Article 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
simply that an action against an individual who has changed his
domicile may be brought in either parish for a period of one
year unless he has filed a declaration of intention to change his
domicile in the manner provided by law. This provision is briefer
than those formerly used, 72 but apparently it fully covers the
subject and effects no change in the law.73 Articles 41 and 42
of the Civil Code provide the method of changing one's domicile74
and as matters of substantive law they are unaltered.
Formerly the Revised Statutes provided that a person en-
gaged in a commercial business could be sued in all matters con-
nected with the business in the parish where the business was
carried on, or at his domicile.75 Article 77 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides essentially the same rule, with only three
minor changes.76 The new provision is not limited to "commer-
cial establishments," but applies to a "business office or estab-
lishment." Nor is the new provision limited to individuals, but
it refers to actions against a "person," which is defined in the
new Code as including corporations and partnerships. More-
over, the new provision is applicable to nonresidents. 7  This
72. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 167, 168 (1870). Article 166 of the Code
of Practice, providing for venue in case of a defendant residing alternately in dif-
ferent parishes, has no equivalent in the' Code of Civil Procedure. Article 38 of
the Civil Code covers the same situation in its definition of domicile, and it is
retained and provides the present rule. Since it is a question of substantive law,
and not of procedure, this would appear to be a correct disposition of the matter.
73. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EX-
Post DES MOTIFS No. 3, Book I, Courts, Actions and Parties, Title I, Courts
Chapter 2, Venue, p. 2 (1951).
74. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 41 (1870) provides: "A.change of domicile from one
parish to another is produced by the act of residing in another parish, combined
with the intention of making one's principal establishment there."
Id. art. 42 provides: "This intention is proved by an express declaration of it
before the recorders of the parishes, from which and to which he shall intend to
remove.
"This declaration is made in writing, is signed by the party making it, and
registered by the recorder."
75. Li . R.S. 13:3236 (1950).
76. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUnE art. 77 (1960) provides: "An action against
a person having a business office or establishment in a parish other than that
where he may be sued under Article 42, on a matter over which this office or
establishment had supervision, may be brought in the parish where this office or
establishment is located."
77. Id. art. 77 provides in part: "An action against a person having a business
office... :" The definition of person, provided in Article 5251(12), is that it in-
cludes "an individual, partnership, unincorporated association of individuals, joint
stock company, or corporation." While this does not specifically say it applies to
non-residents as well as residents, such is the interpretation given it by Comment
(b) following Article 77.
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latter provision subjects everyone, resident and nonresident
alike, to suit in the parish where they are doing business. 8
WAIVER AND RELATED PROVISIONS
The general rule is that if the defendant fails to object timely
to improper venue a valid judgment may be rendered. 9 How-
ever, Article 44 of the new Code provides that in certain cases
this rule does not apply. In these cases the failure of the de-
fendant to object will not waive the proper venue, and any judg-
ment rendered in the improper court will be a nullity. The theory
of these non-waivable rules of venue is that in these cases the
state has an interest in having the suit tried at a particular
place. It might appear that the waivable rules of venue corre-
spond to the former jurisdiction ratione personae, which was
waivable because it was for the convenience of the defendant
alone. Likewise, the non-waivable rules of venue might appear
to correspond to jurisdiction ratione materiae, which was not
waivable because it was deemed to be for the benefit of the
public.8 0 Such, however, is not the case under the new Code for
jurisdiction ratione materiae" is designated as jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and the rules of venue which may not be
waived are referred to as rules of jurisdictional venue. A brief
look will be taken at each of these non-waivable rules, and any:
changes made in the former law will be indicated.
Under the new Code actions to annul judgments must be
brought in the trial court, even though the judgment has been
affirmed or even rendered by the appellate court."' The virtue
of this provision is that it eliminates confusion in the former
law over this delicate problem.8 2 . However, it is in accord with
78. Two additional miscellaneous venue provisions should be mentioned at this
point. In the case of a demand against a third party, id. art. 1034 provides essen-
tially the same rule of venue as was formerly provided in LA. CODE OF. PRACTICE
art. 165(4) (1870)..
LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165(7) (1870) provided the venue for suits to
enforce the collection of bonds of state officers. This rule has been transferred by
L& R.S. 13:3239 (1950) by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6.
79. LA. CODE OF CIVII PROCEDURE art. 44 (1960).
80. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 210 (1951).
81. LA. CODE OF CrVm PROCEDURE art. 2006 (1960). While this is not strictly
speaking a venue provision because it does not deal with the parish in which an
action must be brought, it is a related problem and it is felt that it is worthy of
treatment in this Comment.
82. Adlins' Heirs v. Crawford, Jenkins & Booth, 200 La. 561, 8. So.2d 539
(1942) ; Succession.of Martin v. Succession of Hoggatt, 37 La. Ann. 340 (1885).
See Comment, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 623 (1941) ; The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term - Civil Procedure, 7 LOUISIANA LAw Ri-
vxzw 282, 272-73 (1947).
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the latest cases on the subject,8 3 and cannot be said to make any
change in the law.
The second rule which Article 44 provides may not be waived
is that a succesion must be opened in the parish where the de-
ceased was domiciled at the time of his death, and if he was not
domiciled in this state at that time it must be opened either
where his immovable property is situated or if he has no such
property, where his movable property is situated."4 This article
is a clarification and simplification of the former law, and is in
all important respects identical.8 5
Also non-waivable is the rule that if a succession of a non-
domiciliary is opened in more than one district court, the one
in which it is first opened shall retain jurisdiction and the other
courts shall stay their proceedings.86 The court retaining juris-
diction may by ex parte order adopt any proceedings taken in
any other competent Louisiana court.8 7
Article 3941 requires that an action for a separation from
bed and board and for divorce shall be brought in the parish
where either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the last
matrimonial domicile. Strong public policy dictated that this
rule not be waivable, 8s which is in accord with the cases for-
merly holding that the question in divorce cases is one of juris-
diction ratione materiae and therefore may not be waived.8 9
Formerly such an action could be brought at the domicile of
the plaintiff only in those cases in which the action was based
either on R.S. 9:301, the two-year divorce act,90 or on Civil Code
83. Adkins' Heirs v. Crawford, Jenkins & Booth, 200 La. 561, 8 So.2d 539
(1942).
84. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2811 (1960).
85. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 929 (1870); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 935
(1870), repealed, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2; LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 35, 81.
86. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2812 (1960).
87. Ibid.
88. Id. art. 3941, Reporter's Comments; Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
vIEW 210, 220 (1952).
f9t McGee v. Gasery, 185 La. 839, 171 So. 49 (1936). Cf. Burgan v. Burgan,
207 La. 1057, 22 So.2d 649 (1945) ; Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.2d 859
(1943). There is perhaps no other area of venue which points out so well the
difficulties experienced under the former law in distinguishing between jurisdiction
ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae. See the separate opinions by
Chief Justice O'Niell in Zinko and Zinko and Burgan and Burgan supra. The new
Code eliminates the confusion by treating venue as jurisdictional, and providing
that it may not be waived.
90. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950) formerly provided: "When married persons have
been living separate and apart for a period of two years or more, either party to
the marriage contract may sue, in the courts of his or her residence within this
state, provided such residence shall have been continuous for the period of two
years, for an absolute divorce, which shall be granted on proof of 'the continuous
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Article 142, which provided that if the plaintiff is a resident
and the defendant a nonresident the suit may be brought at the
residence of the plaintiff. 1 The new provision effects needed
uniformity and at the same time makes no great change, since
formerly many actions of divorce were founded on the two-year
act. In addition the new provision provides that suit may be
brought at the matrimonial domicile. Under the prior law only
in dictum was it indicated that the matrimonial domicile was
a proper venue. 2
As is evident, several changes are effected in the rules of
venue for divorce proceedings. The new rules are, in a sense,
more liberal than those in ordinary cases, for suit is permitted
not only at the domicile of the defendant, but also at that of the
plaintiff and at the matrimonial domicile. On the other hand,
in two ways the rules of venue for divorce actions are more
restrictive than most of the other rules. First, the rule is not
waivable, and a judgment rendered in a court of improper venue
is an absolute nullity. This means that the parties will not be
able to choose the court they wish simply by the expedient of
the plaintiff bringing suit there and the defendant agreeing not
to except to the improper venue. This provision does not change
the former law.9 3 Second, unlike most of the general rules of
venue, the provisions applicable to the venue prescribed for di-
vorce and separation proceedings have no exceptions.
The injection of the concept of matrimonial domicile into the
law might be open to some question.9 4 It is essentially a conflict
of laws concept and had its first impact on Louisiana law as a
result of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Atherton v. Atherton9 5 to the effect that only the state of the
matrimonial domicile had jurisdiction to render a divorce con-
stitutionally entitled to full faith and credit. The redactors state
living separate and apart of the spouses, during the period of two years or more."
As amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1, it now reads: "When the spouses
have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of two years or more,
either spouse may sue for and obtain a judgment of absolute divorce."
91. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 142 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1,
no longer contains any provision for the venue in such a suit.
.92. Wreyford v. Wreyford, 216 La. 784, 44 So.2d 867 (1950) ; Hymel v. Hymei,
214 La. 346, 37 So.2d 813 (1948) ; Burgan v. Burgan,.207 La. 1057, 22 So.2d 649
(1945); Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.2d 859 (1943).
93. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3941, Comment (f) (1960).
94. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA IW REVIEW 210, 220 (1952).
95. 181 U.S. 155 (1901). The test of the Atherton case was changed in 1942
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942), which held that any state in which one of the parties is domiciled is com-
petent to dissolve the marriage.
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that its addition makes certain that a wife who has been aban-
doned may sue for a separation and ultimately a divorce in the
parish where the abandonment occurred.90 Another advantage
claimed by those who argued for its adoption was that it allows
the trial to be at the point of most substantial connection with
the marital status.9 7 It is submitted that in most cases its ad-
dition is not necessary to achieve this result, since either the
domicile of the plaintiff or of the defendant will in fact be the
point with the closest nexus with the marriage. And despite the
adoption of this provision, if the plaitniff does not desire the
suit to be at the point of closest nexus, he is permitted to sue
elsewhere, assuming that either he or the defendant has a domi-
cile elsewhere.98
The petition of a minor for judicial emancipation must be
filed in the parish of his domicile,99 and this provision may not
be waived.10 This remedies the uncertainties existing under
the former law, which provided that such a petition had to be
presented to "the judge having jurisdiction."''
Neither may the venue stipulated for a petition for the ap-
pointment of a tutor be waived by the defendant. 0 2 Article 4031
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in case of death of
one parent such a petition must be filed at the domicile of the
surviving parent, and if the parents are separated it must be
filed in the parish of domicile of the parent awarded custody.
In all other cases the petition must be filed in the parish where
the minor resides. This effects some slight change in the former
law, under which the petition was required to be filed at the
domicile or usual residence of the "father and mother of such
minor, if they or either of them be living," and if they had no
such domicile, at that of the minor's nearest relations.0 8 This
was complicated by the provision of Civil Code Article 307,
which provided that the appointment, recognition, or confirma-
96. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3941, Comment (e) (1960).
97. See Comment, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 366, 372 (1951).
-98 In other words, without a provision for suit at the matrimonial domicile,
permitting suit at the domicile of the plaintiff or of the defendant would, in most
cases, permit the plaintiff to have the action'tried in the parish with the closest
connection with the marriage, if the plaintiff so desired. And if the plaintiff does
not desire to try it in such parish, he may avoid doing so, even with the provision
for venue at the matrimonial domicile.
99. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCED RE art. 3991 (1960).
100. Id. art. 44.
101. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 385 (1870).
102. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 44, 4031 (1960).
103. LA. CODE OF PaACTICE arts. 944, 945, 946 (1870).
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tion of tutors had to be by the judge of the parish where the
principal estate of the minor was situated.10 4 With the adoption
of the Code of Civil Procedure this latter provision was re-
pealed,105 and the result is the elimination of the former con-
flicting provisions.
Nor may the venue provided for a petition to have a person
interdicted be waived by the defendant. Article 4541 of the
Code of Civil Procedure requires such a suit to be filed in the
parish of domicile of the person to be interdicted. This is in-
tended to overrule the former interpretation of Article 392 of
the Civil Code, which required the suit to be brought at the
residence of the defendant. Under that holding a Louisiana
domiciliary who resided out of the state could not be interdicted
in the parish of his domicile. 00 The reason originally given for
this rule was that a valid service could not be made outside of
the state, and although provision was later made for the ap-
pointment of an attorney at law to represent the absent person
and to receive the service of process,107 the rule remained that
the petition had to be brought at his residence. 08
CONFLICTS
The infinite combinations of parties and causes of action
possible make it inevitable that conflicts will arise between the
numerous venue provisions. Under the former law if a suit fell
within the terms of two mandatory provisions it could be
brought in the venue provided in either. 109 Article 45 of the
Code of Civil Procedure deals specifically with this problem. It
provides that Articles 78 through 83 are the mandatory excep-
tions to Article 42, and that Articles 71 through 77 are the per-
missive exceptions. The mandatory exceptions govern over the
permissive. If, however, a case falls within two or more manda-
tory provisions or only within two or more permissive provi-
sions, the plaintiff is permitted to exercise a choice.
William S. Moss, Jr.
104. LA. CrviL CODE art. 307 (1870).
105. Id. art. 307, repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2.
106. Interdiction of Lepine, 160 La. 953, 107 So. 708 (1926) ; In re Dumas,
32 La. Ann. 679 (1880).
* .107. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 391 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1948, No. 321.
108. Interdiction of Toca, 217 La. 465, 46 So.2d 737 (1950).
109. Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153 (1906).
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